What do market participants need to be doing now?
The immediate issue for counterparties is volatility in the markets. We have seen particular volatility in sterling and the UK and global stock markets. Counterparties will be reviewing their existing positions to ensure that they remain appropriate for evolving market conditions.
Counterparties should also be ensuring that they have sufficient liquid assets to satisfy collateral demands. If there are significant reductions in the value of sovereign and corporate debt, additional collateral may be required. If there are credit downgrades, this might have the effect of reducing the types of eligible collateral that can be posted. Counterparties should therefore ensure that their collateral processes are robust and functioning properly.
We have seen S&P and Fitch downgrade the UK’s credit ratings and, whilst we have not seen any indication that banks will be downgraded, it is prudent for counterparties to be prepared for that outcome over the coming weeks and months. That could result in credit downgrade events of default being triggered, where counterparties would need to consider their options and potentially act to terminate contracts.
With the increased possibility of the Bank of England’s base rate of interest being set to negative, counterparties should also ensure that their trading documentation adequately caters for this eventuality. This would typically be achieved through adhering to the ISDA negative interest rate Protocol for qualifying contracts, or by making bilateral changes to contracts for non-qualifying derivatives and other trades.
Should market participants continue to comply with, and implement, EMIR and SFTR?
While the United Kingdom remains a member of the European Union, the duties under EMIR and SFTR which apply to counterparties - and any duties under the MiFIR regulation in relation to trading when it comes into force - continue to apply. In a statement issued last Friday, the FCA, which is the competent authority in the UK charged with enforcing EMIR, stated that: “firms must continue to abide by their obligations under UK law, including those derived from EU law and continue with implementation plans for legislation that is still to come into effect.”
What happens to EMIR following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU?
The precise effects of withdrawal and whether EU Regulations such as EMIR and SFTR will continue to have a direct effect in the UK remains uncertain.
To the extent that the UK was to remain in the European Economic Area, then EMIR and SFTR should continue to have effect (as it does in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein which are members of the EEA but not members of the EU).
To the extent that the UK does not remain in the EEA or no other full mutual EU recognition regime is put in place, then EMIR would not apply to trades entered into between overseas banks and UK banks. However, given that EMIR gives effect to an international G20 obligation which falls, in any event, on the UK, it is likely that the same or similar requirements that apply under EMIR in the UK will apply after withdrawal. The UK Parliament will have to make, or empower another authority to make, a law to this effect.
Whatever the outcome - but particularly in a post Brexit UK which does not remain in the EEA and which does not benefit from full mutual recognition - there will be many competing demands for rule-makers’ time and attention. One would therefore expect that, at least initially, any new UK rules would be based on - or borrow heavily from – the current EU rules. This is what market participants will be familiar with and they should already be compliant with these rules. Over time, the UK’s rules could track new EU regulation in order to obtain and maintain some recognition of equivalence or it could diverge – for example, the UK might choose to follow the way that some jurisdictions have implemented legislation to deal with G20 objectives in a more user-friendly way. For example, EMIR requires both EU parties to any trade to report their transactions but Dodd Frank in the US only imposes this obligation on major swap participants who report for both themselves and their counterparties.
Further, EMIR does provide a mechanism for the recognition of third country central counterparties (CCPs) subject to the UK satisfying an “equivalence” requirement. The effect of “third country recognition” is that it would be possible for EU counterparties to clear trades with UK counterparties through a UK CCP with CCPs being treated as qualifying CCPs for the purpose of the EU banks’ regulatory capital requirements under the EU Credit Requirements Regulation.
Irrespective of the final arrangements between the UK and the EU, to the extent that a UK counterparty trades with an EU counterparty, that trade will be subject to EMIR. The effect of this is that many of the provisions relating to risk mitigation techniques will apply because of the EU counterparty’s requirement to comply with these. If there were no equivalence status for a non-EEA UK, EMIR would not require an EU counterparty to clear trades except in limited circumstances but one would expect the UK to introduce its own clearing requirement or UK counterparties may still wish to clear for pricing or exposure purposes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is likely to be no significant change for some years, and possibly no real change in practice if we remain in the EEA or there is some form of equivalence recognition. Even if a post Brexit UK completely breaks away from the EU, an ongoing requirement on the UK to implement international objectives which the EU implements through EU regulations, and market familiarity and infrastructure, means that in practice the likelihood is that market participants are still going to have to comply with EU regulations for a number of years to come. However, we have seen how quickly things change and counterparties should be monitoring the position on an ongoing basis and considering whether and how to influence policy makers and regulators to ensure that workable solutions are found for whatever Brexit model the UK ends up following.